Enhancing Security of Advanced Metering Infrastructure by Introducing Threshold Attendance Protocol , Journal of Telecommunications and Information Technology, 2014, nr 2 by Konorski, Jerzy & Makutunowicz, Artur
Paper Enhancing Security of Advanced
Metering Infrastructure by Introducing
Threshold Attendance Protocol
Artur Makutunowicz1 and Jerzy Konorski2
1 VeriFone Sp. z o.o., Warsaw, Poland
2 Faculty of Electronics, Telecommunications and Informatics, Gdańsk University of Technology, Gdańsk, Poland
Abstract—The industry pushes towards Smart grid systems in
order to resolve current limitations of the unidirectional legacy
power grid infrastructure. By introducing Advanced Meter-
ing Infrastructure (AMI) as an integral part of the Smart grid
solution, the utility company obtains an invaluable tool to op-
timize its network, lower the operational costs, and improve
quality of service. Unfortunately, introducing two-way com-
munication poses a security risk to the power grid infrastruc-
ture. In this paper the authors consider a Threshold Atten-
dance Protocol (TAP) acting in a reverted security paradigm.
Its main idea is to keep the network load at a predictable level
at all times. To achieve that, TAP in AMI environment is em-
bedded and the solution using real-life simulation parameters
is validated.
Keywords—Secret sharing, Security, Smart grid.
1. Introduction
Legacy electric power grid delivers electricity to the end
user in an unidirectional way. It has worked eﬀectively
for many decades, but currently demand and diﬀerentia-
tion increases so that a more interactive method of deliver-
ing electricity is required. A Smart grid oﬀers a solution
by introducing Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) as
its core part, which facilitates two-way communication be-
tween the utility companies and the customer.
When the customer is allowed to interact with the power
systems, it poses a potential risk to power grid stabil-
ity. There are many security challenges related mostly to
frauds. By introducing more capabilities, including the re-
mote load disconnect command, a power grid might face
a new type of Denial of Service attacks. The main goal of
the adversary is to make the power grid unstable by dis-
connecting load from a large number of smart meters. As
a result, the grid might enter a non-optimal state or a black-
out might happen. The remote disconnect messages can
be sent by the central station also referred to as Metering
Data Management System (MDMS). In this paper the au-
thors assume MDMS is vulnerable to attacks and can
start sending unauthorized load disconnect messages. There
might be numerous reasons of such behavior, including,
but not limited to, external attack, untrained operator, or
a software bug.
To prevent such attacks, a protocol named Threshold Atten-
dance Protocol (TAP) is proposed. It solves the problem of
unauthorized load change provided the network elements,
with a possible exception of MDMS, follow the protocol.
In this paper TAP in the AMI environment is set, its imple-
mentation is described, and simulation results with exten-
sive comments is provided. The authors believe it is a step
towards making TAP a more real-life solution.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In the fol-
lowing subsection related work focusing on AMI and its
real-word implementations is discussed. Section 2 outlines
TAP. In Section 3 the basics of AMI and smart grid are ex-
plained. Subsequently, in Section 4 implementation details
are discussed and the communication model is described.
Section 5 focuses on experiments with TAP involving real-
world parameters. The paper is concluded in Section 6,
providing a short summary and suggesting future areas of
research.
1.1. Related Work
There are multiple areas of research related to the content
presented in this paper. As a general idea, Threshold At-
tendance Protocol has been deﬁned in [1], but it was not
embedded in AMI environment and had no real-world pa-
rameters deﬁned. Its sole purpose was to present the idea
and reason behind the solution validity. Shamir secret shar-
ing scheme [2], around which TAP is built, has been proven
to work correctly and reliably in many diﬀerent applica-
tions, ranging from securing broadcast transmissions [3]
to digital cash protocols [4].
AMI and Smart grid are extensively studied areas of re-
search. Several lessons learned from the actual implemen-
tation have been presented in [5]. Smart grid was ﬁrst
introduced in [6]. Advanced Metering Infrastructure with
the focus on the communication architecture was described
in [7]. Related communication technologies and capacity
planning were discussed in [8] and [9].
Smart grid and AMI security challenges were described
in numerous papers, e.g., [10]–[12]. However, their fo-
cus was on the physical security within a standard secu-
rity paradigm, whereby the central station can be trusted,
whereas the smart meters cannot. In this paper a reverted
security paradigm is assumed, whereby the central station
42
Enhancing Security of Advanced Metering Infrastructure by Introducing Threshold Attendance Protocol
(MDMS) may turn rogue whereas the nodes (Data Con-
centrators) can be considered secure. It seems to be a rea-
sonable assumption, as the Data Concentrators (contrary
to smart meters) are located in safe and monitored places,
usually owned or managed by a utility company.
Maintaining a global consensus-like condition in a dis-
tributed system with adversaries, of which threshold at-
tendance is a special case, is generally treated in [13].
2. Threshold Attendance Protocol
The main goal of the Threshold Attendance Protocol, called
global condition, is to keep the predeﬁned number (also re-
ferred to as the threshold, T ) of nodes in active state at
all times. TAP allows a distributed system where a cen-
tral entity is a potential adversary to nevertheless keep the
global condition. TAP is a message-based protocol using
Shamir’s secret sharing scheme to agree on the global con-
dition between distributed nodes in a secure way.
There exist two types of devices in TAP architecture: node
and DSCC (Data Sink/Command Center). Each node con-
trols a generic device that can be in or out of service,
referred to as Enabled and Disabled states, respectively.
When a node decides to disable the associated device (this
event might be triggered either internally or externally) it
has to ask all the remaining nodes for a permission to make
sure the global attendance condition will not be violated.
If the network consists of n nodes with a threshold T, then
at least T nodes have to endorse the original request, and
guarantee to stay Enabled while the requesting node can go
to Disabled state.
DSCC acts primarily as a forwarding device, i.e., the nodes
can communicate via the DSCC only, and direct commu-
nication is not possible. However, the DSCC can work in
two modes: it can either be well-behaved, i.e., employ op-
timization algorithms in order to minimize the delays and
total number of messages in the network, or it can become
rogue and try to jeopardize the global condition by try-
ing to disable more than n-T nodes. Therefore, one of the
main assumptions is to maintain the global condition at all
times, while during normal operation the traﬃc ﬂow should
be optimized. When the DSCC launches an attack, the ef-
ﬁciency might be diminished, but the threshold attendance
condition will be still met.
All the intelligence is embedded into DSCC. The nodes are
simple, resource-constrained devices and are not capable of
running any complicated algorithms.
TAP is built around a well-known threshold cryptography
scheme – Shamir secret sharing [2]. Its main idea is to par-
tition a secret key into several chunks and distribute them to
multiple entities. In order to recover the key, a predeﬁned
number of chunks is required. The key can be reconstructed
using many techniques such as Lagrange interpolation or
solving a system of linear equations.
The TAP message ﬂow is fully asynchronous. A simpliﬁed
generic scenario is provided below and also presented in
Fig. 1 [1]:
5. Disabled
6. Enabled
1. Disable request
4. Disable
authorization 3. Disable
endorsement
2. Disable endorsement
request
7. Enable
notification
Requesting
node
DSCC
> = T
other nodes
Fig. 1. Basic TAP message ﬂow.
• A node R sends a Disable request message when it
decides to go out of service. After sending the mes-
sage, the node remains in-service. A conﬁrmation
from the network is required to change the state to
Disabled.
• The DSCC receives the Disable request message and
forwards it as Disable Endorsement Request to at
least T nodes excluding the requesting node R.
• When a node in Enabled state receives the Disable
endorsement request, it generates a session key based
on the master secret key, divides it into chunks and
sends one chunk encapsulated in Disable endorse-
ment message.
• Once DSCC collects at least T valid Disable en-
dorsement messages it recovers the session key and
sends Disable authorization message to the request-
ing node R.
• Node R validates the Disable authorization message
and transitions to Disabled state.
• Node R becomes Enabled after an external event
occurs.
• Node R sends Enable Notiﬁcation to the DSCC.
More detailed TAP description is provided in [1].
3. Advanced Metering Infrastructure
This section is an introduction to the concept of smart grid,
AMI being its most recognizable part. The authors deﬁne
the AMI architecture, touch upon its beneﬁts and empha-
size security challenges associated with two-way commu-
nication between the utility company and the customer.
The smart grid can be deﬁned as a modern electric power
grid for improved resiliency, including self-healing capa-
43
Artur Makutunowicz and Jerzy Konorski
bilities [14], security, and eﬃciency. It also provides
a seamless integration with renewable energy sources [6].
Smart grid can be also thought as an umbrella term en-
compassing dozens of technologies and protocols, with ex-
tensive use of Information and Communication Technolo-
gies. At the highest level it can be divided into three main
parts: Substation Automation, Phasor Measurement Units,
and Advanced Metering Infrastructure, the latter being the
most recognized part of the smart grid solution. As a re-
sult of introducing AMI, the utility company can bene-
ﬁt in several ways from the most trivial automated meter
reading to enhanced demand prediction and load-balancing
capabilities.
The basic communication architecture and key devices are
depicted in Fig. 2. AMI consists of the following parts:
central data storage server – Metering data management
system (MDMS), Data concentrators (DCs), smart meters
(SM), and communication network [5]. The communi-
cation system typically uses a three-tier architecture. If
improved scalability is required, more ﬁne-grained hierar-
chy levels may be introduced. Bidirectional communication
takes place between consumer and the utility company in
order to achieve the goals deﬁned by the smart grid.
WAN
Data concentrator Data concentrator
Metering data
management system
Smart meters Smart meters
Fig. 2. High-level Advanced Metering Infrastructure diagram.
Smart meters are devices installed at the customer’s
premises and communicate directly with the Data concen-
trators. There are multiple communication technologies
(both wired and wireless), but Power Line Communication-
based ones seem to be most promising. The main beneﬁt
of PLC communication is a possibility of reusing exist-
ing power lines, thus installation costs and overall solution
complexity are decreased. PLC might not be suitable for
applications that require high bandwidth as the maximum
raw data rate is about 20 Kb/s [8]. Data concentrator to
smart meters connectivity details are outside the scope of
this paper.
The main function of the DC is to act as an intelligent proxy
between the SM and the MDMS. All data between SM and
MDMS are exchanged via DC. Typically DC uses PLC on
the smart meters side and cellular (GPRS, UMTS, LTE)
technology on the WAN side. The WAN segment of the
communication system is not usually owned by the utility
company and is provided as a service by the specialized
provider (both wireless and wired).
The MDMS acts as the central entity of the network. It
allows the operators to connect, disconnect, manage, and
monitor loads, detect any tamper attempts on the equip-
ment, investigate faults etc. It might also serve as an inter-
face to other systems (e.g. billing).
Taking into account the huge number of nodes, heteroge-
neous environment, scalability and reliability requirements,
a protocol suite of choice is TCP/IP – it is scalable, ﬁeld-
tested, and known for its interoperability with existing net-
work technologies.
There might be multiple applications using AMI, but two
basic types of communication messages can be deﬁned:
data (interval data read) and maintenance (such as discon-
nect/reconnect requests, connectivity tests, ﬁrmware up-
grade). Interval data read messages consume the largest
share of bandwidth as they are sent most frequently (every
15–60 minutes) and by every meter [9].
Another beneﬁt of AMI is the capability of extensive power
quality monitoring. It can be achieved by sampling cur-
rent and voltage waveforms, then analyzing the results in
real-time. Despite the power line monitoring, smart me-
ters can provide invaluable stream of data required to op-
timize energy generation, scheduling, and demand plan-
ning [15].
Security challenges arising from the introduction of two-
way communication are numerous. Smart meters are lo-
cated at customer’s premises, which brings about a non-
negligible risk of fraud (energy theft) and can be related to
the theft of information, denial of service, and manipulation
of the service [10]. However, it does not pose a signiﬁcant
risk on the infrastructure as a whole, as long as the number
of fraudulent customers is very low. A much higher risk
to the critical infrastructure is an attack vector involving
the adversary taking over the MDMS and sending an unau-
thorized load reduction request to the DCs. The MDMS
might be easier to attack as it uses oﬀ-the-shelf hardware
and operating system. When a signiﬁcant number of smart
meters is disabled, a potential catastrophic event might oc-
cur (uneconomical operation being the least severe). Thus
it is crucial to ascertain that at least a predeﬁned number
of nodes are enabled at any given time.
Power demand can be predicted with a suﬃcient accuracy
and demand is adjusted accordingly. As long as the demand
follows a predictable trend (e.g., obtained by a historical
observations), the grid remains balanced [16].
Unexpected change in the system behavior caused by the
demand increase or decrease may have serious ramiﬁ-
cations. Especially lowering power demand by disabling
a signiﬁcant number of customers is not desirable and might
cause severe problems with the infrastructure, ranging from
shifting the power grid system from its economically opti-
mal state to a system-wide instability.
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Smart meters have the ability of accepting remote discon-
nect/reconnect commands. This is helpful when used in
an authorized way. However, the problem occurs when
the central management station turns rogue, as a result of
attack, software malfunction, or mistakes by untrained per-
sonnel and issues a huge number of load disconnect mes-
sages, causing the network to become unbalanced. By in-
troducing TAP it is impossible to disable more meters than
a predeﬁned threshold.
4. Simulation
In this section the AMI model used during simulations is
described and details about the simulator implementation
are provided.
The simulation application is implemented using OM-
NeT++ [17] and INET (http://inet.omnetpp.org) frame-
works. There are two distinct parts of the simulation: Node
and MDMS (also referenced as DSCC in the TAP real
AMI). Each of these parts acts as a custom UDP applica-
tion in INET framework sitting on the top of Standard Host
module. OpenSSL library (www.openssl.org) was used as
a base for an implementation of the Shamir Secret sharing
scheme.
The main goal when creating the simulator application was
to accurately simulate TAP in an AMI environment. Based
on the outcome of the simulation experiments, TAP’s cor-
rectness, scalability, and eﬃciency can be estimated. The
results of the set of basic experiments are provided in the
next section.
4.1. Model
The AMI network model for TAP consists of two main
building blocks: network requirements and AMI parame-
ters. The ﬁrst group deﬁnes some basic assumptions about
the communication environment for TAP, while the second
provides a number of parameters required to run the sim-
ulation. The assumptions and parameters in both groups
should be as close as possible to real-world implemen-
tations.
Let’s consider AMI to be a two-tier network with MDMS
being the central entity and Data concentrators acting as
nodes. Thus, without loss of generality, the inﬂuence of
individual smart meters is suppressed in order to make the
solution more scalable. With this assumption in mind, it is
worth emphasizing that when DC gets a disconnect mes-
sage, all smart meters associated with this DC are discon-
nected. Therefore MDMS can act on an area/cluster level
of abstraction (DC being considered a cluster head), hiding
unnecessary local details from the global view.
The basic assumptions about the AMI communication net-
work are [1]:
• Both node and communication links are reliable. If
a message is sent by MDMS it always gets to the
node. The node is always operational and processes
packets according to the TAP.
• MDMS is a central communication point. Regardless
of the communication technology it is not possible for
the nodes to communicate directly. MDMS forwards
all the messages between nodes. However MDMS
might delay, drop or alter the message as a result of
turning rogue.
• Nodes are secure. Data concentrators (referenced as
a nodes) are physically secure, located in a guarded
premises (e.g. power substations) and implement var-
ious anti-tamper techniques [18]. Each nodes stores
a unique ID and shared key using a secure storage.
• The Threshold attendance level is constant. In real-
world scenarios, T might vary throughout the net-
work lifetime. However, in this model T – the cru-
cial parameter of the Shamir secret sharing scheme
is constant and known to all the network nodes. It
is possible to avoid this restriction by using a proto-
col external to TAP, possibly based on a public-key
infrastructure, but it is outside the scope of this paper.
In proposed model, simple point-to-point links are used
with Point-to-Point Protocol (the physical link type is not
strictly deﬁned). It is lossless, although this assumption
can easily be relaxed. All the communication is UDP-based
(TAP messages are encapsulated in UDP messages).
TAP parameters are chosen to closely reassemble real-life
setups. Based on [9] following values were deﬁned:
• Interval data read frequency. Each node sends In-
terval data read message every 60 minutes. In AMI
networks there are two main approaches to interval
data reading: sending periodic data messages (usually
every 15–60 minutes) and aggregated batch transfer
(once a day), the former being the preferred one.
• Remote disconnect/reconnect frequency. In AMI ev-
ery node oﬀers a remote cut-oﬀ and start-up capa-
bility. Disconnect/reconnect messages are not sent
frequently (at most once a day) and typically few
nodes send them every day. However in simulation
a high fraction (10, 50, and 100%) of nodes send
disconnect/reconnect messages is assumed.
• Message size and bandwidth. Every Interval Data
Read message is 25 bytes long, which corresponds
to the 400 MB per year approximation in [5]. How-
ever, in proposed model several message types con-
tributing to the overall bandwidth, such as ﬁrmware
updates tamper-detect messages, etc. are omitted as
they are not relevant to the discussion.
Although the model reassembles real AMI environments
quite accurately, there are still some assumptions (notably
the constant T ) that prevent the model from using it “as
is” in the production AMI networks. The authors leave
removing this obstacle to future work.
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5. Experiments
There are two issues to be solved: solution validation and
its performance/scalability. First a brief introduction to test-
ing methodology is presented, next the experiments’ results
are provided and discussed.
The simulations were launched on a regular PC with
Ubuntu Linux installed. A month of the network life-time
was simulated. It was a trade-oﬀ between the simulation
time and statistical credibility of the results. A set of de-
fault parameters is laid out in Table 1.
Table 1
Default simulation setup
Parameter Value
Number of nodes 30, 100
Fraction of nodes sending Disable request 1.0, 0.5, 0.1
Threshold attendance 5, 10, 15
Average interval between Data messages 60 minutes
Average interval between Disable request
12 hoursmessages
Average time spend in the Disable state 8 hours
Each simulation run was repeated 3 to 5 times with a dif-
ferent random number generator seed and the output values
were averaged to create the ﬁgures.
5.1. Validation
The model and implementation is required to be validated
by ﬁnding that the number of active (enabled) nodes never
falls below T . In the ﬁrst experiment two set of parameters
were used: T = 5 in experiment depicted in Fig. 3 and
T = 15 in experiment shown in Fig. 4. The remaining
parameters were conﬁgured to the default values.
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Fig. 3. Number of active nodes in time. Threshold attendance 5.
100% of the nodes sending Disable request messages.
Figure 3 describes an experiment when the “natural” be-
havior of the system is not aﬀected. The number of active
nodes is strictly related to other parameters (e.g., frequency
of sending Disable Request messages) and remains above
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Fig. 4. Number of active nodes in time. Threshold attendance 15.
100% of the nodes sending Disable request messages.
the threshold at all times. However, when the threshold
is increased from 5 to 15 (Fig. 4), one of the scenarios
(n = 30, T = 15) changes its characteristics. Some of the
nodes need to wait in order to transition to Disabled state
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Fig. 5. Number of active nodes in time. Threshold attendance 5.
10% of the nodes sending Disable request messages.
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Fig. 6. Number of active nodes in time. Threshold attendance 15.
10% of the nodes sending Disable request messages.
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as the global condition cannot be violated. This is the price
to pay for the increased security as nodes cannot transition
to Disabled states uncontrollably.
It is worth emphasizing that both scenarios should be
treated as worst-case, since the ratio of nodes requesting
transition to Disable state p = 1.0 is nowhere near realis-
tic environments. When the parameter p is lowered to to
10% (p = 0.1), the active node count stays way above the
threshold (cf. Figs. 5 and 6 respectively).
Multiple simulations with variable threshold parameters
was performed and in no scenario was the global condi-
tion violated.
5.2. Scalability and Efficiency
Protocols designed for AMI networks must be scalable as
the number of nodes tends to be large and adding new
nodes should not inﬂuence the whole system behavior in
a signiﬁcant way.
One of the experiments was designed in order to check
the scalability of the solution. The total size of both In-
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Fig. 7. Interval data read messages total size, 100% of the
nodes sending Disable request messages, T = 15 and total bytes
transmitted n = 100.
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Fig. 8. Interval data read messages total size, 50% of the nodes
sending Disable request messages, T = 15 and total bytes trans-
mitted n = 100.
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Fig. 9. Interval data read messages total size, 10% of the nodes
sending Disable request messages, T = 15 and total bytes trans-
mitted n = 100.
terval data read and TAP messages sent by each node was
calculated and plots the average value in Figs. 7–9.
Each ﬁgure shows results generated for two sets of conﬁg-
uration parameters: regular and aggressive. Regular uses
12 hours delay between Disable request messages and each
node spends 8 hours in the Disabled state, while aggressive
uses 8 hours and 6 hours, respectively. More details about
the traﬃc share between Data/TAP messages can be found
in Table 2.
Table 2
Traﬃc shares for one simulation-month
(default parameters)
p 0.1 0.5 1.0
Interval data read [KB] 18 18 18
Total traﬃc [KB] 40 92 120
Fraction of TAP traﬃc [%] 55 80 85
In each scenario, the total size of Interval data read mes-
sages is almost constant and does not depend on TAP pa-
rameters (these messages are sent using regular intervals).
However, TAP messages, required to guarantee the global
condition consume a signiﬁcant amount of bandwidth in
comparison to data messages. Based on these results, it is
easy to conclude that the total size of TAP messages grows
in a linear fashion and depends on fraction of nodes taking
part in the message exchange, and Disable request mes-
sages sending frequency (note that each message triggers
a large amount of Disable endorsement request messages).
In a real-life scenario the traﬃc shares (Table 2) might be
diﬀerent if the Interval data read messages are sent more
frequently, as the typical interval between such messages is
15 minutes [19].
Obviously, the scalability of the solution is not satisfac-
tory, but several factors might be changed to improve it.
Currently, MDMS uses a trivial algorithm of sending Dis-
able endorsement request messages as these messages are
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sent to all nodes (including those in the Disabled state).
MDMS might be modiﬁed to send to active nodes only.
In order to achieve it, state-tracking capabilities should
be introduced in MDMS. TAP allows many such im-
provements if they depend on MDMS implementation
only.
In order to improve the scalability on the architectural level,
some well-known techniques as clustering or hierarchiza-
tion might be introduced. These approaches combined with
an aggregation at the cluster head level might be quite ef-
fective in enhancing solution scalability. The authors are
going to address this issue in future work.
6. Summary and Future Work
In this paper an introduction to Advanced Metering Infras-
tructure is presented, focusing on the communication and
security challenges. Threshold Attendance Protocol was
described as a way to solve security issues in a reverted
security paradigm. The authors also described proposed
implementation of TAP and discussed a number of experi-
ments with real-life scenarios.
The main contribution of this paper is taking TAP one step
towards real-life scenarios. TAP in the AMI environment
was embedded and moved from a general message passing
implementation to UDP-based communication system us-
ing full TCP/IP stack. The results of the simulation were
analyzed in order to conﬁrm the solution is valid and to
reason about its scalability.
Several possible areas of further research can be identi-
ﬁed. In particular, the scalability of the solution might
be an issue, hence more eﬃcient communication schemes
and MDMS operation modes should be deﬁned. Cur-
rently TAP uses UDP-based communication. However, it
might be worth considering a diﬀerent transport protocol
(e.g. SCTP) and investigate its eﬃciency. In order to bring
the model closer to real life, a way of changing T during
the network lifetime should be invented.
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